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Abstract
In many countries, the collective sale of TV rights by sports leagues has been
challenged by the antitrust authorities. In several cases, however, leagues won in
court, on the ground that sport cannot be considered a standard good. In this
paper, we investigate the conditions under which the sale of TV rights collectively by
sports leagues, rather than individually by teams, is preferred from a social welfare
viewpoint. We ¯nd that collective sale is socially preferable when leagues are small,
relatively homogeneous in terms of clout and where teams get little performance-
related revenues.
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1Introduction
The sale of broadcasting rights by sports leagues to TV networks has become a highly
debated issue because of the legal and economic questions it raises. One of the most
contentious issues is the collective and exclusive control of the TV rights by sports leagues
{ as con¯rmed by the number of cases brought to court. In 1996, in the Netherlands, the
Football Association (KNVB) sold the TV rights for the retransmission of league games to a
newly established sports channel. Feyenoord (a team from Rotterdam) objected to the deal
claiming that broadcasting rights belong to the club in whose stadium the game is being
played. The KNVB said that the league was the product sold and as the organizer was
the owner of these rights. The Amsterdam District Court ruled that home teams own the
broadcasting rights. The situation in Italy and Mexico is similar: teams are the owners of
the right for their home games and negotiate directly with broadcasters (See OECD, 1997).
Conversely, in France, the Sports Law of July 16, 1984, (amended by the Law of July 13,
1992) says that the \right to a sporting event or competition belongs to the organizer of
that event" (Article 18-1). This means that in the case of national competitions, the rights
belong to the national league.
In England, the collective sale of TV rights by the Premier League (top soccer league)
has been challenged in court by the O±ce of Fair Trading (OFT) on the ground that
centralized sale leads to abnormal pro¯ts. In 1996, John Bridgeman, Director general of
OFT, declared that
\Developments in broadcasting have intensi¯ed the importance of sport in the
market for television programs. Within that market the Premier League has a
major, if not unique position. By selling rights collectively and exclusively to
the highest bidder, it is acting as a cartel. The net e®ect of a cartel is to in°ate
cost and prices".
In 1999, the OFT brought the case to the Restrictive Practices Court and attacked the
Premier League on the ground that it prevents teams from individually selling the rights
2to televise their games (See OFT, 1999). The court ruled that a ban on collective rights
sales would have undermined the Premier League's ability to market its championship as
a whole, robbed the clubs of revenues and harmed attempts to maintain a competitive
balance between big and small clubs.
In the United States as well, courts have had to rule many times on antitrust cases
regarding sports leagues (see Flynn and Gilbert, 2001).
These examples indicate that there is no general agreement between courts and leg-
islators about the degree of cooperation to be allowed among the members of a sports
league.
The goal of this paper is to shed more light on this problem by performing a comparative
welfare analysis of the two salient ways leagues use to sell TV rights to broadcasters. In
other words, the question we ask is the following: Under what circumstances, if any, does
the sale of TV rights collectively by the league, rather than directly by teams, lead to a
welfare loss?
To answer this question, we build a model in which clubs with heterogeneous bargaining
power participate in a Championship. Before the beginning of the competition, teams
choose how much to invest in talent (players, coaches, etc.). For each team, the probability
of winning the competition depends on its relative talent level with respect to all the
other teams. As in Fort and Quirk (1995), Palomino and S¶ akovics (2001) and Szymanski
(2001), we assume that the demand for each match by sport fans depends on two elements:
competitive balance, that is the outcome uncertainty, and the (average) talent of the two
playing teams. Teams are assumed to be pro¯t maximizing agents and have two sources of
revenues: an exogenous monetary prize1 they get for their performance in the championship
and the sale of TV rights.
In this context, we compare an individual with a collective system of sale of TV rights.
1This prize is a proxy for all sorts of performance-related revenues, including progression to international
competition such as the UEFA Champions League in the case of European soccer or the Heineken Cup in the
case of European rugby union. We normalize non-performance related revenues (other than broadcasting
fees) to zero.
3Under the individual system, TV networks negotiate with each team separately the rights
to broadcast its home games. In contrast, under a collective system the league negotiate
collectively the sale of TV rights for all the games with broadcasters. TV revenues are then
allocated among all teams according to a given sharing rule.
We isolate three e®ects. The ¯rst one is a bargaining power e®ect: by selling their rights
collectively, teams' bargaining power is modi¯ed with respect to the case of individual sale.
This e®ect may have a positive or negative impact on welfare, depending on the relative
values of the bargaining powers. The second e®ect is a prize e®ect. If the exogenous
monetary prize is small, the league can increase teams' incentives to invest by choosing
a performance-based revenue sharing scheme. In such a case, collective sale is welfare
improving. The last e®ect is a free riding e®ect. When rights are sold collectively, teams
take into account the impact of their investment on TV revenue for both their home games
and their away games. However, since the TV revenues are shared by all teams, the larger
is the number of teams in the league the smaller are teams' incentives to invest .
The combination of these three e®ects shows that individual sale is more appropriate in
a league which is large in term of number of playing teams,2 has relatively heterogeneous
teams with respect to their bargaining power, and with a rich exogenous prize.
Our model is related to the literature on cartels and joint ventures. The speci¯c feature
of sport is that, because of its cooperative nature, it spontaneously leads to cartel formation.
As stated by the US Supreme Court (in NCAA vs. Board of Regents) football (as well
as any other team sport) is \an industry in which horizontal restraints on competition are
essential if the products is to be available at all". 3 In other words, a certain degree of
economic coordination in the sports leagues is needed to guarantee a high quality product.
This is the main di®erence between joint pro¯t maximization in standard product markets
2For a same sport, top domestic league may di®er in size across countries. For example, in soccer, the
Swiss league has 8 teams, the Scottish league, 12 teams, the French, Italian and German leagues, 18 teams,
and the English and the Spanish league, 20 teams.
3Report from the conference on \TV Rights in Soccer" by M. Moccia, organized by ISIMM (Istituto
per lo studio dell'Innovazione nei Media e per la Multimedialita'), Rome 30 April 1999.
4and team sport games. In the former, collusion among producers only results in higher
price whereas sport leagues can in°uence both the price and the quality of the product. The
quality of sport games depends on the competitive balance of the competition. The more
balanced a competition is, the more enjoyable it will be to the fans. Leagues can a®ect the
quality of a competition they organize by choosing how to redistribute the revenues from
TV deals across teams. For example, in several top European soccer leagues, teams are
rewarded on a performance basis (See Szymanski (1998), Palomino and Rigotti (2001) and
Palomino and S¶ akovics (2001)). Conversely, in US sports leagues (Baseball Major League,
National Basketball Association, National Football League), revenues from national TV
deals are split evenly among teams.4
If teams are pro¯t maximizing entities, the reward scheme chosen by the league in°u-
ences teams' incentives to win and consequently, the investment in talent (players) they are
willing to make which in turn determines the level of competitive balance and the quality
of the product. In this respect, a sport league is comparable to R&D joint ventures where
the degree of cooperation (or collusion) between parent ¯rms in the production stage in°u-
ences their contribution in the R&D stage. (See, for example, D'Aspremont and Jacquemin
(1988), Kamien et al. (1992), and Suzumura (1992)).
The analysis of the collective sale of TV rights also relates our paper to those on
the e±ciency in partnership by Legros and Matsushima (1991) and Legros and Matthews
(1993). These papers derive conditions under which there exist transfer rules that deter
partners from deviating from the e±cient action. One feature of these rules is that they are
dependent on the identity of the partners whereas the transfer rules, i.e., revenue sharing
rule, the league can choose are necessarily independent of the identity of the winner.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 presents the model. Section 2 contains the
characterization of the equilibrium and analyses in two di®erent subsections the individual
and the collective sale of TV rights respectively. Section 3 compares the impact on social
welfare of the two selling mechanisms, Section 4 discusses some of the assumptions and
4Furthermore, this reward scheme is supported by other rules - selection mechanisms of players, salary
caps, limited amount of investment - also aiming at keeping a high competitive balance within the league.
5Section 5 concludes.
1 The model
The Teams - There are 2N (N ¸ 1) clubs (teams), half of them { i =1 ;2;:::;N {a r e
\powerful", half of them { i = N+1;N+2;:::;2N { are \weak" in terms of their bargaining
power (see below). They are assumed to maximize expected pro¯ts.5 Teams interact in a
competition { described below { and choose how much to spend on players (this is their
only decision variable). We denote by Ii the investment in talent (players/coaches) of team
i.
The Competition - The competition is organized as a round Robin tournament with
home and away games. Hence, each team plays overall 2(2N ¡ 1) games, 2N ¡ 1a th o m e
and 2N ¡1 away. At the end of the competition, the team ranked ¯rst receives a monetary
prize 6 z while the other teams receive nothing.
As is standard in the literature on sports leagues (see, for instance, Atkinson, Stanley,
and Tschirhart (1988), Forth and Quirk (1995)), we assume that the probability fi for team






The Quality of a Match - Following the literature, we assume that the quality of
ag a m ep l a y e db yt e a m si and j depends on two factors: the talent level, Tij,a n dt h e
competitive balance, Bij, that is, the uncertainty of the outcome. We measure talent by
the average investment in talent of the two teams, i.e., Tij =
Ii+Ij
2 , and competitive balance





. Similar investments by the two teams imply close probabilities of
winning the match and consequently a high outcome uncertainty.
5An alternative assumption sometimes used when considering European teams is that they maximize
the probability of winning under some budget constraint. (See Szymanski (2001) for more comments.)
6In Europe, this may include earnings from participation in a continental competition the following
season (UEFA Champions' League in Soccer, Euroligue in Basketball, Heineken Cup in Rugby, ...), or any
other performance related revenue.





with ¯ 2 (0;1=2).
Substituting for Tij and Bij in the expression for Qij,w ed e d u c et h a tt h eq u a l i t yo fag a m e






That is, the quality of a match between team i and j is produced by a Cobb-Douglas
technology with decreasing returns to scale.7 Note that by this particular functional form
we can simultaneously capture both the substitutability { an increase in the investment
(talent) of any team always improves quality even if it reduces competitive balance { and
the complementarity { the above rate of improvement depends on the talent level of the
o p p o n e n t{o fi n v e s t m e n t s . 8 It is the exponent, ¯, that parametrizes the rate at which the
marginal rate of substitution is diminishing { that is, the relative magnitude of these two
e®ects.
The Demand for a Match - There is a continuum of TV viewers who di®er in their
willingness to pay for a match of a given quality. Each agent k's net utility gain from
watching a game played by teams i and j is
Max(xkQij ¡ pij;0)
where pij is the price charged by the TV network for the game9 and xk measures the
keenness on sport of agent k.T h u s ,xkQij is the reservation price of agent k for this match.
7The same Cobb-Douglas technology to measure the quality of a game could be obtained in several
di®erent ways. For instance, we could alternatively measure competitive balance by the opposite of the


















8This is what warrants the squaring of Tij in the formula for Qij.
9We implicitly assume that TV viewers can buy games on an individual basis, i.e., a pay-per-view
system is in place. This assumption is made for tractability. Our results go through if we assume that TV
viewers buy all the games in case of collective sale, and buy all the home games of the considered team in
case of individual sale.
7For simplicity, we assume that the xi are uniformly distributed in [0;1] { and thus the
measure of potential viewers is normalized to 1:





It follows that, normalizing the cost of broadcasting to zero, the pro¯t from broadcasting
this game is ¼ij = pijDij: The pro¯t of the network ¼n
ij is a fraction of the broadcasting
pro¯ts, determined by its bargaining power vis-µ a-vis the team or the league: The network
wants to maximize its pro¯t. As a consequence, it sets pij = Qij=2, yielding a broadcasting
pro¯t ¼ij = Qij=4.10
The Negotiation - There are two possible mechanisms. Under individual sale, si-
multaneously, each club negotiates directly with the TV network the broadcasting rights
for their home games, meaning that each team sells the right to broadcast 2N ¡ 1 games.
Clubs di®er in their bargaining power when negotiating with a TV network. Team i's bar-
gaining power is captured by a coe±cient ®i 2 [0;1] which measures what fraction of the
pro¯t from the broadcast of its home games team i gets. If ®i = 0, then the broadcaster has
all the bargaining power and so gets all the surplus. Conversely, if ®i =1 ,t h e nt e a mi has
all the bargaining power and so gets all the surplus.11 We denote by ®p and ®w (®p >® w)
the bargaining weights of the powerful and weak clubs, respectively. Similarly, under the
collective sale, the bargaining power of the league when selling the TV rights is captured
by ®L 2 [0;1] which measures the fraction of the pro¯t from the broadcast of all the games
t h el e a g u ei sa b l et og e tf r o mt h en e t w o r k .
Revenue Sharing - If TV rights are sold collectively, then { as Atkinson, Stanley
and Tschirhart (1988) { we assume that the it chooses the level of revenue sharing so as
to maximize the teams' joint pro¯t.12 We denote by µ the fraction of the TV revenues
10The study of competition in the pay TV market is beyond the scope of this paper. See Armstrong
(1999) and Harbord and Ottaviani (2001) for papers addressing this issue.
11A c c o r d i n gt oC h e m l a( 2 0 0 1 ) ,®i also measures the degree of competition in the broadcasting industry.
The more competitive this industry, the larger share of pro¯t the selling team gets.
12In practice, the governing body of a league is comprised of one voting representative from each member
8awarded at the end of the competition to the winner, the remaining fraction (1 ¡ µ)b e i n g
redistributed evenly to teams before the competition. If the league sets µ =0 ; we have a full
revenue sharing, i.e., the league splits the TV revenues evenly across teams independently
of their performances. Note that { given that the clubs are symmetric under collective sale
{ the revenue sharing does not play any role in achieving competitive balance. That is, by
assuming symmetry, we bias our analysis against the collective selling procedure.
The Timing - T h es e q u e n c eo fe v e n t si st h ef o l l o w i n g :
1. If a collective system of sale is in place, the league sets the revenue sharing rule.
2. Teams choose how much to invest in talent.
3. Deals are negotiated with TV networks, according to the selling mechanism in place.
4. The competition takes place.
2 The equilibrium levels of investment
In this section we derive the level of investments that clubs make in equilibrium (under
both sales mechanisms), which will enable us to carry out the welfare comparison in the
next section.
2.1 Individual sale of TV rights















club and major issues must be approved by majority or supermajority vote. (See Flynn and Gilbert, 2001).
Here, we implicitly assume that the maximization of the joint pro¯ts has been approved as the objective
of the league and its implementation has been delegated to a commissioner.
9The ¯rst and second terms represent the expected monetary value of winning the com-
petition and the revenue from the sale of TV rights for the 2N ¡ 1 home games the team
plays, respectively. The last term is the expenditure on talent.
In the case of individual sale, an equilibrium is a vector of investment levels (I¤
ind;1;:::;I¤
ind;2N)












For the sake of simplicity, in the rest of the paper we concentrate on symmetric equilib-
ria, i.e., equilibria in which all powerful teams choose the same investment level I¤
ind;p = I¤
ind;i
with i =1 ;:::;N and all weak teams choose the same investment level I¤
ind;w = I¤
ind;j with
j = N +1 ;:::;2N:
















Hence13 a symmetric equilibrium (I¤
ind;p;I¤
ind;w) is a solution of the following system of
equations.
z
NIw +( N ¡ 1)Ip












NIp +( N ¡ 1)Iw








p +( N ¡ 1)I
¯
w)=1 : (2)
2.2 Collective sale of TV rights
The main qualitative di®erence between the collective and the individual sale of TV rights
is that in the former case, the league can choose how to redistribute the revenues from the
sale of the TV rights to teams. Denote by µ the fraction of the TV revenues awarded to
the winner of the competition, the remaining fraction (1¡µ) being redistributed evenly to
13It is easy to check that the S.O.C. for a maximum are satis¯ed
10teams. If the league sets µ =0 ; we have full revenue sharing, that is, the league splits the
TV revenues evenly across teams independently of their performance. If µ =1 ,w eh a v ea
winner-takes-all situation.
Let RT(I1;:::;I 2N) be the total revenue generated by the broadcast of all the games







































where the ¯rst term represents the expected exogenous prize and the second one the ex-
pected TV revenues. In fact, if µ>0, the TV revenues received by a team are performance-
dependent. Therefore, a team receives µ®LRT with probability Ii=
P2N
j Ij; i.e., if it wins
the competition, and (1 ¡ µ)®LRT=2N with probability 1.
As a consequence, the optimal investment level chosen by team i; I¤
c;i, will depend on
the level of revenue sharing chosen by the league.












2.2.1 Characterization of the symmetric equilibrium
Let us turn to the problem of the league ¯rst. If it could choose the (common) investment
level, I¤
c, the league would maximize













2¯¡1 ¡ 2N =0 ;








That is, the collectively optimal investment level of the clubs is increasing in the number
of teams in the championship (since the number of games played increases geometrically), in
the returns to scale of the \quality producing" technology, and in their collective bargaining
power. Notice that there is a threshold level at (2N ¡ 1)¯®L = 2, yielding I¤
c =1 : If the
LHS is larger then the optimal level of investment is likely to be quite high, while in the
opposite case, quite low { where the steepness of the transition is the more pronounced the
closer is ¯ to a half.
The question then is whether the league can induce the clubs to make the collectively
optimal investment by a judicious choice of revenue sharing.

























































While this equation cannot be solved analytically, it is easy to see that { generically {
it does have a unique, positive solution.15 Moreover, as expected, I(µ) is strictly increasing
in the winner's share (µ):


























14Again, it is easy to check that the S.O.C. is satis¯ed.
15Note that the LHS is continuous and strictly decreasing in I, from in¯nity to zero.
12From here, the following proposition follows directly:
Proposition 1 The optimal level of revenue sharing for the league is always strictly lower
1: In particular, µ¤ 2 [0;2¯]: It will be able to attain its ¯rst-best investment (I¤
c)i fa n d
only if the aggregate ¯rst-best investment (2NI¤
c) exceeds the exogenous prize. Otherwise,
it will choose full revenue sharing as a second-best solution.
There are two incentive e®ects at work here among teams. On the one hand, a revenue
sharing system independent of performance produces a free-riding e®ect.N o t et h a tt e a m s '
investment decisions have a direct impact on the TV revenues from both their home and
away games (2(2N ¡ 1) games overall). However, under full revenue sharing they will get
only a fraction 1=2N of these revenues. Consequently, the clubs do not internalize the
positive externalities of their investment decision and rather, tend to free ride on each
other. A performance-related reward can countervail this e®ect.
On the other hand, a performance-related reward acts as a substitute for the exogenous
prize, z by enhancing teams' incentives to win and, therefore, to invest. The competition
for this composite prize gives rise to a rent-seeking e®ect, which may be detrimental to
competitive balance within the league.
In conclusion, when z is small, teams have little incentives to win, so the free-riding
e®ect dominates. The league can correct this situation by choosing a µ larger enough in
order to enhance investment. Conversely, when z is large, the league needs to moderate
teams' incentives to win and, thus, chooses a large level of revenue sharing (small µ). In
fact, for very large z, it would in principle be optimal to punish teams for doing well in the
competition. The best the league can do in this case is to opt for full revenue sharing.
3W e l f a r e a n a l y s i s
In order to perform a comparative welfare analysis of the two selling mechanisms, we need
to compute the level of social welfare generated by each of them ¯rst.
13In Section 1, we derived that the price of a game played by teams i and j is pij = Qij=2,
yielding a pro¯t ¼n











































We de¯ne the level of social welfare as the sum of consumers' welfare, teams' pro¯t, the
TV network's pro¯t, and players' revenue (i.e., teams' investment in talent). Given that the
only cost faced by teams is player's revenue, it does not in°uence the level of social welfare.
It is only a transfer from teams to players. Furthermore, since there are no broadcasting
costs, the sum of the pro¯t of the network and teams is the total pro¯t generated by game
broadcasting. This implies that social welfare for a single game is determined by the sum





































Note that maximizing the social welfare is proportional to the total quality. Therefore,
the socially optimal system of sale is the one which maximizes the total quality of the
tournament and, this choice is irrespective of whether the regulator is concerned with TV
viewers' welfare, the producers' surplus or both.
14In order to isolate the various e®ects generated by the collective sale of TV rights (as
compared to individual sale), we consider several cases. First, we separate the cases N =1
and N>1.
3.1 A two-team \league"
If N = 1, there are only two teams in the league and only two games are played. As a result,
the free-riding e®ect is still positive, but equally strong under both selling mechanisms.
To see this, recall that under collective sale the clubs recoup a proportion of
2(2N¡1)
2N of
the marginal product of their investment. Under individual sale, they only care about
their home games, so the same factor is 2N ¡ 1: When N =1 ; the two factors coincide.
Consequently, if the exogenous prize is not high enough, the league can improve welfare {
as compared to individual sale { by setting up a performance related reward.
We analyze ¯rst the case z =0 ; for which we are able to derive closed-form solutions
in the investment game both in the case of collective and individual sale. In this case, the
only source of revenue for teams is the sale of TV rights. From the system of ¯rst-order









































15Assume that ®L = °®p +( 1¡ °)®w with ° 2 [0;1]. That is, the league's bargaining
power is somewhere in between the bargaining powers of the powerful and weak team's.
We can derive the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Assume that N =1and z =0 :




4 then Wc >W ind.



























The area where individual sale dominates
Proof: See Appendix.
When z = 0, we know from Subection 2.2 that the league chooses µ¤ =2 ¯.A s a
consequence, the league creates a prize for the winner. This generates the optimal incentives
to invest for both teams. We call this e®ect the prize e®ect. Collective sale has a two more
e®ects on investment (as compared to individual sale). First, if °>0, then the weak team's
incentives to invest increase since its bargaining power increases. In turn, this increases
the powerful team's incentives to invest because of strategic complementarity. Second,
if °<1, the powerful team has less incentive to invest because its bargaining power is
decreased. In turn, this decreases the weak team's incentives to invest. We call these two
e®ects bargaining power e®ects.
If ®p=®w is not too far from one (at least smaller than 4), the bargaining power e®ects
are relatively small. At the same time, the prize e®ect is independent of the ratio ®p=®w.
16Thus, if ®w >® p=4, the prize e®ect is the stronger, hence collective sale yields a higher
level of social welfare than individual sale irrespective of °.
To illustrate this, consider the extreme case in which ®w = ®p = ®. Under such an
assumption, we have Wind = 3
4(®¯=4)2¯=(1¡2¯) and Wc = 3
4(®¯=2)2¯=(1¡2¯).
If ®p=®w is large (i.e., larger than 4), then the bargaining power e®ects are important.
If ° is small, then the negative bargaining power e®ect dominates the positive one. As a
consequence, the level of social welfare with individual sale is larger than with collective
sale. As ° increases, the intensity of the negative bargaining power e®ect decreases, while
the intensity of the positive bargaining power e®ect increases. As a consequence, there
exists a threshold beyond which collective sale again increases the level of social welfare.
Note that the above analysis also applies when there is a positive exogenous prize.
As long as the league wishes to implement an endogenous prize,16, the result remains
qualitatively the same as above. The only di®erence is that, as z grows, the conditions for
collective sale to be the dominant selling mechanism become tighter.
When z is large, there is no prize e®ect: The league chooses full revenue sharing (µ¤ =0 ) .
Undere collective sale, the equilibrium investment is the solution of
¯®LI
2¯
c + z =4 Ic: (7)












(Iw + Ip)2 = Iw: (9)
Despite the lack of \organizational" advantage, if the league's bargaining power is suf-
¯ciently close to the powerful club's one, the bargaining power e®ect is so strong that






; c.f. Proposition 1.
17Proposition 3 Assume that z is large so that µ¤ =0in case of collective sale. If the
league's bargaining power is closer to the powerful team's one, i.e. ° ¸ 1=2, then collective
sale dominates individual sale, Wc >W ind.
Proof: See Appendix.
3.2 Large leagues
As we have seen, when there are more than two teams in the league, the collective sale
of TV rights generates a free-riding e®ect. In order to characterize it, we analyze an
homogeneous league, i.e., a league in which all teams have the same bargaining power:
®p = ®w = ®L = ®. Of course, in such a case the bargaining power e®ect is null. Also, we
assume that z is large so that µ¤ = 0. In such a case the prize e®ect is also null.
From Equation (5), we deduce that in the case of collective sale, the ¯rst-order condition









From Equations (1) and (2), we deduce that in the case of individual sale, the ¯rst-order









It is straightforward that Iind >I c; whenever N>1. Hence, individual sale generates
a higher welfare level than collective sale.
The reason for this result is the following. Under individual sale, the clubs' investment
has a direct e®ect on their payo® only through their home games (2N ¡ 1g a m e s ) ,s i n c e
they only receive TV revenues for their home games. Under collective sale, the e®ect is on
all their games, but divided among the 2N clubs:
2(2N¡1)
2N : Clearly, the marginal incentive
under collective sale is 1=N times the one under individual sale.
184 Discussion
Apart from the exogenous monetary prize, our model focuses exclusively on TV revenues
(both are performance-dependent). TV revenues have indeed become increasingly impor-
tant in teams' budgets as shown by the table below:
1999-2000 season England Italy Spain Germany France
Total clubs' revenues 530 430 380 360 230
Total TV revenues 200 260 190 105 210
TV revenues/tot. revenues (%) 38% 60% 50% 29% 91%
Table 1: Data on clubs' revenues for the major European football leagues
Source: World Soccer, June 2000. The data are in millions of pounds
In reality, however, teams have other sources of revenues, such as gate and sponsorship
income, which may not be performance-related. For example, a fraction of gate income
may come from fans who attend games independently of the quality of the visiting team.
If team i has a speci¯c revenue Si(Ii), this provides additional incentives to invest, and so
the social welfare increases under both individual and collective sale. However, our results
would not change qualitatively by the introduction of this additional source of revenue
because the three e®ects we have identi¯ed (bargaining, prize and free riding e®ect) will
still be at work.
Another implicit assumption of our model is that teams have unlimited access to the
capital market (that is, they are not budget constrained), hence they can always implement
their ¯rst best investment decision which is the best reply to their competitors' strategy.
Introducing budget constraint means that teams are no longer symmmetric under a col-
lective sale. There would be poor and rich teams. Then the collective sale of TV rights
would also generate a wealth e®ect. The league would transfer revenues from rich teams
19to poor teams in order to increase the investment level of poor teams and decrease that of
rich teams. However, since the welfare level is concave in investment levels, the increase of
the welfare level due to the higher investment of poor teams is larger than the decrease of
the welfare level due to the lower investment of rich teams. As a consequence, the redis-
tribution of TV revenues increases the welfare level. Hence, budget constraints provide an
additional reason to promote collective sale.
5C o n c l u s i o n
The way sports teams should be allowed to market the TV right for their home games (col-
lectively or individually) is a highly debated issue in many countries. In order to ¯nd which
system is better, we have performed a comparative welfare analysis. Taking individual sale
as a benchmark, we have shown that collective sale generates three e®ects. The ¯rst one
is a bargaining power e®ect: by selling their rights collectively, teams' bargaining power
is modi¯ed with respect to the case of individual sale. This e®ect may have a positive
or negative impact on welfare, depending on the relative values of the bargaining powers.
The second e®ect is a prize e®ect. If the exogenous monetary prize is small, the league
can increase teams' incentives to invest by choosing a performance-based revenue sharing
scheme. In such a case, collective sale is welfare improving. The last e®ect is a free-riding
e®ect. When rights are sold collectively, teams take into account the impact of their in-
vestment on TV revenue for both their home games and their away games. However, this
TV revenue is shared by all teams. The result is that the larger is the number of teams in
the league the smaller are teams' incentives to invest when rights are sold collectively.
Taking into account these three e®ects, we derive the result that individual sale is more
appropriate in a league which is large, (that is, with a large number of teams) has relatively
heterogeneous teams and a relatively weak league (that is, the di®erence of bargaining power
between teams is large and the league's bargaining power is close to the weak teams') and
where the exogenous prize is large.
20Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2:
We already know that Wc >W ind is equivalent to
4®
2
L >® w®p (10)




p +( 1¡ °)
2®
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Rearranging and dividing both sides by ®2
w, we obtain the following second-order polynomial
in x = ®p=®w:
x
2 + x

















.A l s o
both roots are below one for °>2+
p
3
4 : When °<2¡
p
3
4 ; then any x value that is not
between the roots will satisfy the inequality.
2
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 :As we have seen, in case of collective sale, the equilibrium
investment is the solution of
¯®LI
2¯
c + z =4 Ic;






(Ic + Ic)2 = Ic












(Iw + Ip)2 = Iw
21Now, note that when N =1 ,Wc >W ind is equivalent to I2





























Therefore, if ° ¸ 1=2 (that is, 2®L ¸ ®w +®p )w eh a v et h a tWc >W I since { because the
®'s are no greater than one {, ° ¸ 1=2 also implies ®2
L >® w®p. 2
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